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  This case requires us to address the difficult balance the state secrets doctrine strikes 
between fundamental principles of our liberty, including justice, transparency, 
accountability and national security. Although as judges we strive to honor all of these 
principles, there are times when exceptional circumstances create an irreconcilable 
conflict between them. 
  —Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan1 
INTRODUCTION 
Britel’s captors hang him from the ceiling of a decrepit cell and beat him 
with a cricket bat.2 After a few weeks of sleep deprivation beatings, he confesses 
to being a terrorist.3 At one moment Britel is told that his interrogators will kill 
him if he does not cooperate—soon after they tell him he will get to return home 
to Italy.4 Instead, he is flown to Morocco where he is kept in squalid conditions 
for eight years.5 Despite having all charges against him dismissed, Britel remains in 
Ain Bourja Prison in Casablanca.6 A lawsuit is brought on his behalf in the United 
States against the corporation that took part in his rendition, for violating his most 
basic human rights.7 The case is dismissed.8 The reason: state secrets.9 
The state secrets doctrine exists in an area of inherent tension. Victims often 
bring legitimate claims seeking compensation for wrongs, errors, or mistreatment 
by government officials. However, when litigation of a claim necessitates the 
exposure of sensitive, secret, government material, such as documents related to 
the search for terrorism suspects or the identity of undercover intelligence 
officers, the government also has a legitimate interest in ensuring that that 
sensitive material does not become public. This balance is controlled by two 
different strands of the state secrets doctrine: the Totten10 bar to litigation, which 
acts as a nonjusticiability doctrine, and the Reynolds11 evidentiary privilege, which 
excludes evidence that contains state secrets. 
 The Totten-Reynolds dichotomy has generally allowed judges to prevent 
disclosure of state secrets without dismissing legitimate claims. More recent 
decisions have dramatically altered this balance. Two cases in particular, Mohamed 
v. Jeppesen Dataplan12 and El-Masri v. United States,13 exemplify the disturbing 
alteration of this traditional doctrine. El-Masri and Jeppesen are uniquely worthy of 
 
1. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, 614 F.3d 1070, 1071 (9th Cir. 2010). 
2. First Amended Complaint at 26, Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc. (Jeppesen I), 539 F. 
Supp. 2d 1128 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (No. 5:07-cv-02798 (JW)). 
3. Id.  
4. Id. at 26–27. 
5. Id. at 27–31. 
6. Id. at 31. 
7. See Complaint, Jeppesen I, 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (No. 07CV02798). 
8. Id. at 1136. 
9. Id. 
10. Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1876). 
11. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953). 
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analysis because even though the courts analyzed them as Reynolds cases, they alter 
the doctrine in a way that privileges facts, rather than evidence. In essence, these 
cases prevent plaintiffs from pursuing each evidentiary avenue to proving a fact, 
regardless of whether that avenue is protected by the state secrets privilege. This 
expands the evidentiary privilege that each court was using into the realm of a 
nonjusticiability doctrine, similar to Totten. Jeppesen and El-Masri have dangerously 
broadened the state secrets doctrine through the conflation, both doctrinally and 
in application, of the Reynolds evidentiary privilege and the Totten bar. Ironically, 
the resulting doctrine does not, in fact, increase protection of secret, sensitive 
material. 
El-Masri and Jeppesen are factually similar in that the plaintiffs’ claims in both 
cases arose from extraordinary rendition and torture. In one case, five plaintiffs 
were at different times, kidnapped, tortured, and imprisoned in CIA “Black 
Sites,”14 including Kabul’s infamous “Dark Prison.”15 Several remain incarcerated 
in foreign countries.16 Although this similarity does not bear on the application of 
the doctrine itself, it highlights the highly sensitive nature of the evidence the 
government seeks to protect in state secrets cases and the importance of the civil 
rights at stake. 
This Note will assume that there is a need for a state secrets doctrine. 
Because the existence of the doctrine has been so passionately debated for 
decades, the scope of this Note is limited to recent developments in the doctrine 
and solutions to the problem of balancing the need for secrecy and government 
accountability.17 
Part I of this Note will provide the essential history of the Reynolds and Totten 
doctrines. Part II will use the plaintiffs in Jeppesen as a case study to illustrate the 
lifecycle of a modern state secrets case. This is useful for two reasons: first, it 
demonstrates the very complex nature of state secrets cases; second, it highlights 
the enormous danger of dismissing such cases. Part III will explain the 
dysfunctional analysis the El-Masri and Jeppesen courts used to effectively 
restructure the state secrets privilege as an immunity or nonjusticiability doctrine. 
 
12. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan (Jeppesen III), 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc), cert. 
denied, 131 S. Ct. 2442 (2011). 
13. El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007). 
14. The black sites are CIA interrogation facilities, clandestinely operated throughout the 
world. For an image of a black site, the story of Mohamed Bashmilah is illustrative. See Mark 
Benjamin, Inside the CIA’s Notorious “Black Sites,” SALON (Dec. 15, 2007, 1:00 AM), http://www.salon 
.com/2007/12/15/bashmilah/singleton. 
15. The Dark Prison, formally known as the “Salt Pit,” is a Black Site located in Kabul and 
known for keeping its prisoners in complete darkness. See Craig S. Smith & Souad Mekhennet, 
Algerian Tells of Dark Term in U.S. Hands, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 7, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/ 
07/07/world/africa/07algeria.html. 
16. The facts of Jeppesen are discussed at length in Part II. 
17. For a debate about the need for a state secrets privilege, see LOUIS FISHER, IN THE NAME 
OF NATIONAL SECURITY: UNCHECKED PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE REYNOLDS CASE (2006). 
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Part V will advocate for an alternative method of analysis for the state secrets 
privilege and offer several solutions to the problem of litigating matters that 
involve state secrets. Specifically, this Note advocates for the creation of a subject 
matter court to handle sensitive state secrets cases, thereby minimizing the 
dismissal of legitimate claims and disclosure of sensitive information. 
I. THE STATE SECRETS DOCTRINE: ITS BIRTH AND DEVELOPMENT 
The state secrets doctrine emerged as a common law rule of evidence, but 
courts have since expanded it into a rule of constitutional scope. This expansion 
was primarily caused by the executive branch’s persistent and repeated 
propounding of the argument that authority over military secrets is 
constitutionally committed to the executive and that it is improper for the 
judiciary to interfere in this regard.18 
A. The Totten Bar or Nonjusticiability Doctrine 
The first and oldest case, Totten v. United States, created the state secrets bar to 
litigation.19 In that case, a former Union spy from the Civil War sued the U.S. 
government alleging that he was never paid under the terms of his contract made 
with President Abraham Lincoln.20 The Court dismissed the case because the 
contract was of a type that required secrecy and precluded judicial enforcement. 
The Court explained the purpose of the bar: 
An action cannot be maintained against the government, in the court of 
claims, on a contract for secret services during the war, made between the 
president and the claimant. Conceding the engagement to be valid, it is of 
a nature requiring secrecy. If upon contracts of such a nature an action 
against the government could be maintained in the Court of Claims, 
whenever an agent should deem himself entitled to greater or different 
compensation than that awarded to him, the whole service in any case, 
and the manner of its discharge, with the details of dealings with 
individuals and officers, might be exposed, to the serious detriment of the 
public.21 
Totten has been interpreted as a justiciability or jurisdictional limitation,22 
although recent interpretations of Totten resemble an immunity doctrine.23 It has 
 
18. See Amanda Frost, The State Secrets Privilege and Separation of Powers, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1931, 1935 (2007) (“The state secrets privilege is a common law evidentiary privilege that derives 
from the President’s authority over national security, and thus is imbued with ‘constitutional 
overtones.’”); see also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (“The President shall be Commander in Chief of 
the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States.”). 
19. Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1876). 
20. Id. at 105–06. 
21. Id. at 106. 
22. Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 12 (2005) (Stevens, J., concurring); see also id. at 12 (Scalia, J., 
concurring); see also, e.g., Wilson v. Libby, 535 F.3d 697, 710 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (discussing the 
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since rarely been invoked. Totten has been used in cases where “the very subject 
matter” of the case was a state secret, in particular cases concerning espionage 
agreements with the government like the one in Totten (the “very subject matter 
theory” of the state secrets doctrine).24 Both Totten and Tenet v. Doe, the Supreme 
Court’s most recent invocation of Totten, were premised on contracts for U.S. 
government spies. In Tenet, two foreign spies defected to assist the United States 
with espionage activities, with the alleged understanding that they would receive 
“financial and personal security for life.”25 When the U.S. government failed to 
fulfill its end of the bargain, the two former spies sued.26 The Court dismissed the 
case using Totten and explained the doctrine.27 It wrote, “Totten precludes judicial 
review in cases such as respondents’ where success depends upon the existence of 
their secret espionage relationship with the Government.”28 Although the 
Supreme Court never explicitly limited Totten to espionage agreements, the Court’s 
language in Tenet points in that direction: “When invoking the ‘well established’ 
state secrets privilege, we indeed looked to Totten. But that in no way signaled our 
 
“justiciability doctrine of Totten v. United States”); Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 493 
F.3d 644, 650 n.2 (6th Cir. 2007) (stating that the Totten rule is a “rule of non-justiciability”);  
Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190, 1197 (9th Cir. 2007) (explaining that the 
Totten rule is “a rule of nonjusticiability, akin to a political question”). 
23. There are important similarities and differences between nonjusticiability and immunity. 
Traditional nonjusticiability doctrines direct courts to refrain “from the exercise of judicial power in 
situations that might overly infringe on the prerogatives of another branch of government,” or where 
a case does not constitute a “case or controversy” under Article III of the Constitution due to 
standing, ripeness or mootness problems. Nat’l Ass’n of Gov’t Emp. v. White, 418 F.2d 1126, 1130 
(D.C. Cir. 1969) (regarding separation of powers); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94–96 (1968) 
(regarding “case or controversy” requirements). Consequently, nonjusticiability must be addressed, 
like jurisdiction, before “a federal court may proceed to any other question.” Galvan v. Fed. Prison 
Indus., Inc., 199 F.3d 461, 462–63 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 
U.S. 83, 94–95 (1998)). Immunity, while technically a defense, is similar to a nonjusticiability doctrine 
in that it has also been characterized as “jurisdictional.” FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994). In 
fact, some courts have chosen to address immunity defenses before nonjusticiability doctrines. See, 
e.g., In re Papandreou, 139 F.3d 247, 255 (D.C. Cir. 1998). However, unlike nonjusticiability, immunity 
does not completely prevent a court from hearing a case. Immunity does prevent a court from 
enjoining the defendant’s conduct or ordering the defendant to compensate the plaintiff, but in some 
cases a court might still rule on the underlying constitutional claim. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 
223, 236 (2009) (holding that courts may use their discretion to decide constitutional claims before 
qualified immunity). As a practical matter, Totten’s characterization as one or the other is largely 
unimportant because both doctrines prevent the plaintiff from recovering. However, as more and 
more cases are dismissed as nonjusticiable and the trend begins to resemble an immunity doctrine, it 
sends a strong message to plaintiffs and defendants that government entities will not be held 
responsible for such conduct. 
24. See, e.g., Terkel v. AT&T Corp., 441 F. Supp. 2d 899 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (evaluating an 
agreement between AT&T and the National Security Agency to disclose telephone records under the 
Totten standard). 
25. Tenet, 544 U.S. at 3–4. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. at 8. 
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retreat from Totten’s broader holding that lawsuits premised on alleged espionage 
agreements are altogether forbidden.”29 
One colorful description of Totten comes from Ben Wizner, counsel for the 
plaintiffs in Jeppesen, who described Totten as a “buyer-beware” rule, rather than a 
“victim-beware” rule.30 In other words, Totten only bars litigation by “buyers”—
plaintiffs who have consciously entered into an agreement or relationship with the 
government. The burden is on the “buyers” to recognize that they may have to 
keep the relationship hidden and assume that risk as an implicit condition of the 
agreement. In comparison, Totten is less likely to bar litigation from “victims”—
plaintiffs who interacted with the government against their will. Courts have even 
described Totten as a contract doctrine,31 which bars enforceability of government 
contracts that were secret at the time of their formation.32 The invocation of Totten 
is thus premised on the notion that the plaintiff knowingly entered into a secret 
agreement with the government.33 
B. The Reynolds Evidentiary Privilege 
The other line of cases comes from Reynolds, which created the state secrets 
evidentiary privilege used in Jeppesen and El-Masri.34 Although there is no exact 
definition of what type of evidence is privileged, Reynolds generally applies to 
evidence concerning national security or military matters. In Reynolds, families filed 
 
29. Id. at 9 (internal citations omitted). 
30. Oral Argument at 3:55, Jeppesen III, 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010) (No. 08-15693EB), 
available at http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/view_subpage.php?pk_id=0000004702. 
31. See, e.g., Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974, 991 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (“The implicit 
notion in Totten was one of equitable estoppel: one who agrees to conduct covert operations impliedly 
agrees not to reveal the agreement even if the agreement is breached. But AT & T, the alleged spy, is 
not the plaintiff here. In this case, plaintiffs made no agreement with the government and are not 
bound by any implied covenant of secrecy.”); see also Air-Sea Forwarders, Inc. v. United States, 39 
Fed. Cl. 434, 440 (1997) (“Under Totten v. United States, contracts to perform ‘secret services’ for the 
United States are unenforceable in court.”) (internal citation omitted). 
32. Guong v. United States, 860 F.2d 1063, 1065 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“The words of the 
Supreme Court are clear and unambiguous that ‘[b]oth employer and agent must have understood 
that the lips of the other were to be for ever [sic] sealed respecting the relation of either to the matter.’ 
Hence, it cannot be doubted that Totten stands for the proposition that no action can be brought to 
enforce an alleged contract with the government when, at the time of its creation, the contract was 
secret or covert) (internal citations omitted). 
33. See, e.g., Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan (Jeppesen II), 579 F.3d 943, 952 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(Under the Totten principle, “a suit predicated on the existence and content of a secret agreement 
between a plaintiff and the government must be dismissed on the pleadings because the ‘very subject 
matter’ of the suit is secret.”). 
34. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953) (“It may be possible to satisfy the court, 
from all the circumstances of the case, that there is a reasonable danger that compulsion of the 
evidence will expose military matters which, in the interest of national security, should not be 
divulged. When this is the case, the occasion for the privilege is appropriate, and the court should not 
jeopardize the security which the privilege is meant to protect by insisting upon an examination of the 
evidence, even by the judge alone, in chambers.”). 
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a wrongful death action after a government plane crashed, killing three civilians.35 
The plaintiffs moved for the Air Force’s official accident investigation report 
during discovery proceedings.36 The government, using a letter from the secretary 
of the Air Force, claimed that the documents were privileged under Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure Rule 34 and that it would best serve the public interest if they 
were not produced.37 Despite this, the district court ordered the government to 
produce the documents so that the court could determine whether the claim of 
privilege was valid.38 When the government still refused, the district court 
sanctioned the government by deciding the issue of negligence in the plaintiffs’ 
favor.39 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.40 
The Supreme Court sided with the government, writing, 
We think it should be clear that the term “not privileged” as used in 
[Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] Rule 34, refers to “privileges” as that 
term is understood in the law of evidence. When the Secretary of the Air 
Force lodged his formal “Claim of Privilege,” he attempted therein to 
invoke the privilege against revealing military secrets, a privilege which is 
well established in the law of evidence.41 
Thus, the Reynolds evidentiary privilege was born as a derivative of Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 34. 
The Court then laid out the procedure for the proper invocation of the 
privilege: 
There must be formal claim of privilege, lodged by the head of the 
department which has control over the matter, after actual personal 
consideration by that officer. The court itself must determine whether the 
circumstances are appropriate for the claim of privilege, and yet do so 
without forcing a disclosure of the very thing the privilege is designed to 
protect.42 
Although the court must normally examine the evidence to ensure that the 
invocation of the privilege is legitimate, there are times when “the court should 
not jeopardize the security which the privilege is meant to protect by insisting 
 
35. Id. at 2–3. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. at 5. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. at 6–7 (citing Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1876), Cresmer v. United 
States, 9 F.R.D. 203 (E.D.N.Y. 1949), Pollen v. Ford Instrument Co., 26 F. Supp. 583 (E.D.N.Y. 
1939), Firth Sterling Steel Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 199 F. 353 (E.D. Pa. 1912), Bank Line v. 
United States, 163 F.2d 133 (2d Cir. 1947), Bank Line v. United States, 68 F. Supp. 587 (S.D.N.Y. 
1946), 8 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2212(a), at 161, and 2378(g)(5), at 785 (3d ed. 1940), 1 
GREENLEAF ON EVIDENCE §§ 250–51 (16th ed. 1899), and Sanford, Evidentiary Privileges Against the 
Production of Data Within the Control of Executive Departments, 3 VAND. L. REV. 73, 74–75 (1950)). 
42. Id. at 7–8 (internal citations omitted). 
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upon an examination of the evidence, even by the judge alone, in chambers.”43 In 
these cases, the judge should decide whether or not to deem the evidence 
privileged without examination.44 Reynolds gives the court a balancing test to use to 
evaluate whether or not evidence should be excluded. Assuming that the 
government satisfies the procedures for invocation, the court should consider “the 
circumstances of the case” and weigh the interests of the plaintiff against “the 
danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters which, in the 
interests of national security, should not be divulged.”45 Once the court has 
deemed the evidence privileged, the privilege absolutely makes the evidence 
unavailable.46 Although cases have been dismissed after the invocation of the 
privilege,47 typically, litigation can proceed as long as the “plaintiffs can prove the 
essential facts of their claims without resort to [privileged evidence].”48 
C. Reynolds and Totten as Distinct Doctrines 
During the course of the development of the doctrines, litigants and courts 
have, at times, erroneously considered Reynolds and Totten to be one and the 
same.49 However, the Supreme Court made clear in Tenet that they are, in fact, 
distinct doctrines. Tenet v. Doe, decided in 2005, is the Supreme Court’s most 
recent state secrets case. In that case, two former CIA spies sued the CIA for 
financial assistance when they fell on hard times.50 They alleged violations of both 
substantive and procedural due process, among other claims.51 The Supreme 
Court unanimously dismissed the case, finding that the case fell into the realm of 
Totten: “Totten precludes judicial review in cases such as respondents’ where 
success depends upon the existence of their secret espionage relationship with the 
Government.”52 In dismissing the case, the Court specifically linked Totten to 
espionage agreements,53 although the Court never explicitly excluded the use of 
Totten in other cases. 
 
43. Id. at 10. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. at 9–10. 
46. Id. at 11. 
47. See, e.g., Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159, 1166 (9th Cir. 1998). 
48. Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190, 1204 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting 
Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 11) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
49. Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 8 (2005) (responding to and rejecting the Court of Appeals’ 
argument that “Totten has been recast simply as an early expression of the evidentiary “state secrets” 
privilege, rather than a categorical bar to their claims”); see also Kinoy v. Mitchell, 67 F.R.D. 1, 8–9 
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (using Totten and Reynolds interchangeably). 
50. Tenet, 544 U.S. at 3–4 (2005). 
51. Id. 
52. Id. at 8. 
53. Id. at 9 (describing “Totten’s broader holding that lawsuits premised on alleged espionage 
agreements are altogether forbidden”). 
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The Court did, nonetheless, draw a line between the two doctrines: 
Reynolds therefore cannot plausibly be read to have replaced the 
categorical Totten bar with the balancing of the state secrets evidentiary 
privilege in the distinct class of cases that depend upon clandestine spy 
relationships. . . . There is, in short, no basis for respondents’ and the 
Court of Appeals’ view that the Totten bar has been reduced to an 
example of the state secrets privilege.54  
Despite this clarification, before and after Tenet, courts have confused Totten and 
Reynolds as closely overlapping. The expansion or overlapping of Totten presents a 
very real danger. The Reynolds privilege is broad enough to apply to a diverse and 
large number of cases. Totten, which requires dismissal of the entire case, was 
designed to be narrowly confined to the small subset of cases where the plaintiffs 
more than likely chose to form a relationship with the government.55 Expanding 
Totten into the realm of Reynolds means that dismissal will become more frequent, 
thereby limiting government transparency and eliminating some legitimate claims. 
Further, Totten cases exist in a zone of purely presidential authority. By widening 
the boundaries of this zone, presidential authority becomes more difficult to 
monitor. 
II. A CASE STUDY: THE EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION AND TORTURE OF THE 
JEPPESEN PLAINTIFFS 
In order to understand the implications of Jeppesen and El-Masri, it is 
important to examine the context in which these cases have developed. Both the 
recent history of extraordinary rendition in the United States and the individual 
history of the Jeppesen and El-Masri plaintiffs shed light on the holdings of these 
cases. 
A. A Brief History of Extraordinary Rendition in the United States 
Courts have defined extraordinary rendition as “the clandestine abduction 
and detention outside the United States of persons suspected of involvement in 
terrorist activities, and their subsequent interrogation using methods 
 
54. Id. at 9–10. 
55. Cf. Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Haw. Peace Educ. Project, 454 U.S. 139, 146–47 
(1981). In Weinberger, the Supreme Court applied Totten to a case where environmentalists sued the 
Department of Defense for compliance with environmental laws, which would have led the 
government to disclose the locations of nuclear weapons facilities. This is the one Totten case that did 
not involve a voluntary relationship between the plaintiff and the government. In fact, Jeppesen relied 
on Weinberger in holding that Totten applied to cases outside of those where the plaintiff voluntarily 
entered into a relationship with the government. Jeppesen III, 614 F.3d 1070, 1079 (9th Cir. 2010) (en 
banc). However, because the Weinberger Court cited to Totten only once, and even then as more of an 
afterthought, Weinberger is more properly considered a deviation from the traditional rule. This 
interpretation is also supported by Tenet, which suggested that a relationship with the government is 
required for Totten to apply. 
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impermissible under U.S. and international laws.”56 The use of rendition began 
under President Bill Clinton and continued, arguably to a greater degree, under 
President George W. Bush.57 In President Clinton’s original Presidential Decision 
Directive, extraordinary rendition was specified as a counterterrorism method.58 In 
testimony before the Joint House/Senate Intelligence Committee, then CIA 
Director George Tenet explained that, in the years leading up to September 11, 
2001, the CIA and FBI had “rendered 70 terrorists to justice around the world.”59 
The American media was largely devoid of reports on extraordinary 
rendition until 2005.60 In February 2005, Jane Mayer, a journalist with the New 
Yorker, published an extensive and widely cited exposé titled Outsourcing Torture: The 
Secret History of America’s “Extraordinary Rendition” Program.61 Since its publication, 
there has been extensive public debate and examination of the CIA’s extraordinary 
rendition program. 
The U.S. government has also publicly recognized the existence of the 
extraordinary rendition program. For instance, in December of 2005, Secretary of 
State Condoleezza Rice stated: 
For decades, the United States and other countries have used 
“renditions” to transport terrorist suspects from the country where they 
were captured to their home country or to other countries where they can 
be questioned, held, and brought to justice. In some situations, a terrorist 
 
56. El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 300 (4th Cir. 2007); see also Disappearing Act: 
Rendition by the Numbers, MOTHER JONES, Mar. 3, 2008, http://motherjones.com/politics/2008/03/ 
disappearing-act-rendition-numbers (defining extraordinary rendition as “the extrajudicial transfer of 
an individual to a country where there is a reasonable probability he will be tortured”). International 
sources have defined extraordinary rendition similarly. See, e.g., INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY 
COMMITTEE, RENDITION, 2007, Cm. 7171, at 6 (U.K.), available at http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/ 
resource-library/intelligence-and-security-committee-special-ad-hoc-reports (defining extraordinary 
rendition as “[t]he extra-judicial transfer of persons from one jurisdiction or State to another, for the 
purposes of detention and interrogation outside the normal legal system . . . .”). 
57. David Johnston, U.S. Says Rendition to Continue, but with More Oversight, N.Y. TIMES,  
Aug. 24, 2009, at A8, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/25/us/politics/25rendition.html. 
58. Presidential Decision Directive 39, U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism (June 21, 1995), 
available at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd39.htm. 
59. George Tenet, Written Statement for the Record of the Director of Central Intelligence 
Before the Joint Inquiry Committee (Oct. 17, 2002), available at https://www.cia.gov/news-
information/speeches-testimony/2002/dci_testimony_10172002.html. 
60. The one exception is the case of Maher Arar, which began in 2002. Maher Arar’s story 
could be the subject of substantial study in its own right. For early reports relating to his extraordinary 
rendition, see, for example, Anthony DePalma, Threats and Responses: Detainee; Canadian Immigrant Arrested 
at J.F.K. Is Deported to Syria, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2002, at A14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2002/10/12/us/threats-responses-detainee-canadian-immigrant-arrested-jfk-deported-syria.html; see also, 
Daniel J. Wakin, Threats and Responses: Deportations; Tempers Flare After U.S. Sends a Canadian Citizen Back 
to Syria on Terror Suspicions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2002, at A9, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2002/11/11/world/threats-responses-deportations-tempers-flare-after-us-sends-canadian-citizen.html. 
61. Jane Mayer, Outsourcing Torture: The Secret History of America’s “Extraordinary Rendition” 
Program, NEW YORKER, Feb. 14, 2005, at 106, available at http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2005/ 
02/14/050214fa_fact6. 
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suspect can be extradited according to traditional judicial procedures. But 
there have long been many other cases where, for some reason, the local 
government cannot detain or prosecute a suspect, and traditional 
extradition is not a good option. In those cases the local government can 
make the sovereign choice to cooperate in a rendition. Such renditions 
are permissible under international law and are consistent with the 
responsibilities of those governments to protect their citizens.62 
President Bush, in fact, in 2006 “publicly disclosed the existence of a CIA 
program in which suspected terrorists are detained and interrogated at locations 
outside the United States.”63 And on September 16, 2001, Vice President Dick 
Cheney discussed the government’s new outlook on security in the wake of Al-
Qaeda’s violent attacks on the World Trade Center on the television news 
program “Meet the Press.”64 In that appearance, Vice President Cheney stated that 
the government needed to 
Work, though, sort of the dark side, if you will. We’ve got to spend time in 
the shadows in the intelligence world. A lot of what needs to be done here 
will have to be done quietly, without any discussion, using sources and 
methods that are available to our intelligence agencies, if we’re going to be 
successful. That’s the world these folks operate in, and so it’s going to be 
vital for us to use any means at our disposal, basically, to achieve our 
objective.65  
Despite pre-election indications to the contrary, the extraordinary rendition 
program has continued under the Obama administration.66 
B. The “Dark Side”: The Allegations of the Plaintiffs in Jeppesen 
The allegations of plaintiff Abou Elkassim Britel (also described in the 
introduction to this Note) are emblematic of the severe harm allegedly suffered by 
the Jeppesen plaintiffs. According to his first amended complaint,67 Britel was an 
Italian citizen travelling to Iran and Pakistan in order to obtain financing to 
support his translation work and to conduct research on Islamic issues.68 On 
March 10, 2002, while in Pakistan, he was arrested by the Pakistani police on 
 
62. Condoleeza Rice, U.S. Sec’y of State, Remarks upon Her Departure for Europe (Dec. 5, 
2005), available at http://merln.ndu.edu/archivepdf/terrorism/state/57602.pdf. 
63. El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 302 (4th Cir. 2007). 
64. Meet the Press (NBC television broadcast Sept. 16, 2001). 
65. Id. 
66. See Johnston, supra note 57; Jacob Sullum, Torture Tort Terror, REASON.COM (Sept. 15, 
2010), http://reason.com/archives/2010/09/15/torture-tort-terror. 
67. The accounts of the plaintiffs derive from the allegations made in their lawsuit against 
Jeppesen Dataplan. See First Amended Complaint, Jeppesen I, 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (N.D. Cal. 2008) 
(No. 5:07-cv-02798 (JW)). The case was dismissed at the pleading stage. Because of this, it is unclear 
whether and to what extent the government contests this narrative. 
68. Id. at 25. 
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immigration charges.69 Held at an interrogation facility, Britel was physically and 
psychologically tortured.70 He was beaten with a cricket bat and hung from the 
ceiling for extensive periods of time.71 Succumbing to the torture, Britel falsely 
confessed to being a terrorist, as he was asked to do, and was brought before U.S. 
officials who fingerprinted, photographed, and threatened him.72 He was then 
flown, allegedly by Jeppesen Dataplan, to the Témara prison in Morocco where he 
was kept in total isolation, outside of routine beatings, for eight months.73 Britel 
was released in February 2003, but Moroccan law enforcement officers arrested 
him just three months later after a suspected terrorist bombing.74 Held for four 
months in the Témara prison once more, Britel signed a false confession under 
duress and was later convicted by a Moroccan court of terrorism charges and 
sentenced to nine years’ imprisonment.75 Britel remains incarcerated in Ain Bourja 
Prison in Casablanca.76 Eighty-seven members of the Italian Parliament have 
petitioned for his release, and an Italian judge in 2006 dismissed all terrorism 
charges against Britel, finding a complete lack of evidence.77 Britel nonetheless 
remains imprisoned in Morocco.78 
The stories of the other Jeppesen plaintiffs reveal similarly outrageous harms 
and emphasize the need to minimize unnecessary dismissal of such cases. Plaintiff 
Binyam Mohamed was a twenty-eight year old Ethiopian citizen living in the 
United Kingdom. After U.S. officials suspected that Mohamed had ties with  
Al-Qaeda, Jeppesen Dataplan allegedly flew him to a CIA dark prison in 
Afghanistan and later to the prison in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.79 After over six 
years in custody, a federal judge found that Mohamed was unlawfully detained and 
granted his petition for habeas corpus.80 
Plaintiff Ahmed Hussein Mustafa Kamil Agiza’s ordeal traces all the way 
back to the assassination of President Anwar Sadat in 1982.81 Agiza sought asylum 
in Sweden after being tried in absentia in Egypt for allegedly belonging to an illegal 
 
69. Id.  
70. Id. at 26. 
71. Id.  
72. Id.  
73. Id. at 27–29. 
74. Id. at 29–30. 
75. Id. at 30–31. 
76. Id. at 31. 
77. Id.  
78. Id.  
79. Jeppesen III, 614 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
80. Mohamed’s release and background are discussed in Mohammed v. Obama, 689 F. Supp. 
2d 38, 61 (D.D.C. 2009); see also R. (on the application of Mohamed) v. Sec’y of State for Foreign & 
Commonwealth Affairs, [2010] EWCA (Civ) 65, [2011] QB 218 (appeal taken from Divisional Court) 
(Eng. & Wales). 
81. See First Amended Complaint at 31, Jeppesen I, 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (No. 5:07-cv-02798 
(JW)). 
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organization.82 Jeppesen Dataplan then flew Agiza to Egypt at the direction of 
U.S. officials.83 Agiza remains incarcerated in a maximum security prison in Egypt 
where his health continues to deteriorate.84 According to the plaintiffs, the 
Swedish government has publicly acknowledged Agiza’s account and granted his 
family refugee status.85 The Swedish government also provided $450,000 in relief 
to Agiza for its secondary role in his rendition.86 
Plaintiff Mohamed Farag Ahmad Bashmilah’s rendition began, like others, 
with immigration charges. Bashmilah, a Yemeni citizen, used a falsified Indonesian 
identity card to marry an Indonesian woman.87 Picked up on immigration charges 
in Yemen, Bashmilah was placed in a CIA dark prison where he was exposed to 
constant white noise and alternating deafening music. In fact, Bashmilah was so 
tormented that he slashed his wrists in an attempt to bleed to death, then used his 
own blood to write “I am innocent” on the walls of his cell.88 In March of 2006, 
he was released by the Yemeni government for time served.89 
Plaintiff Bisher al-Rawi is an Iraqi citizen and permanent British resident.90 
From 1996 through 2002, al-Rawi worked as an interpreter for MI5 (a British 
secret service agency) and as an intermediary between MI5 and Abu Qatada, a 
Muslim cleric.91 In 2002, al-Rawi flew to Gambia with several friends with the 
intention of starting a mobile peanut oil processing facility.92 Arrested by British 
authorities for having a “suspicious device” that later turned out to be a battery 
charger, al-Rawi was taken to a dark prison in Afghanistan. In 2003, al-Rawi was 
flown to Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, where he was held for four and a half years 
before being returned to Britain.93 He was never charged with any crime.94 
In 2007, the European Parliament adopted a report concluding that the CIA 
had carried out extraordinary renditions of Mohamed, Britel, Agiza, and al-Rawi.95 
Separately, the Council of Europe, the Office of the Parliamentary Ombudsman 
of the Swedish Government, and the British All Party Parliamentary Group on 
Rendition have each corroborated, in whole or in part, the rendition and treatment 
 
82. Id. at 32. 
83. Id. at 34–35. 
84. Id. at 37. 
85. Id. at 37–38; see also Jeppesen III, 614 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
86. Oral Argument at 2:30, Jeppesen III, 614 F.3d 1070 (No. 08-15693EB), available at http:// 
www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/view_subpage.php?pk_id=0000004702. 
87. See First Amended Complaint at 38, Jeppesen I, 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (No. 5:07-cv-02798 
(JW)). 
88. Id. at 44. 
89. Id. at 46. 
90. Id. at 48. 
91. Id.  
92. Id. at 48–49. 
93. Id. at 50–51, 53–55, 56–58. 
94. Id. at 58.  
95. Id. at 58–59. 
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of plaintiffs Mohamed and al-Rawi.96 In addition, five separate United Nations 
bodies have corroborated all of the plaintiffs’ allegations.97 Extensive flight 
records show that Jeppesen Dataplan participated in the transportation of each 
plaintiff.98 In fact, records show, and the Council of Europe concluded that, 
within a forty-eight hour period, Mohamed was transported on the same plane as 
Khaled el-Masri from the El-Masri case.99 
C. From the “Dark Side” to the Northern District of California 
On May 30, 2007, Mohamed, Britel, Agiza, al-Rawi, and Bashmilah filed a 
civil suit for damages in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of 
California against Jeppesen Dataplan, a subsidiary of Boeing.100 The plaintiffs 
alleged that Jeppesen provided the U.S. government with flight planning and air 
transportation of the plaintiffs in their extraordinary rendition and torture.101 They 
alleged two causes of action under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), a U.S. federal law 
that allows aliens to file tort claims against government officials for violations of 
international law.102 Plaintiffs asserted ATS claims for forced disappearance and 
torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.103 
On October 19, 2007, the U.S. government simultaneously filed a motion to 
intervene and a motion to dismiss.104 The central argument of the motion to 
dismiss was that information required to litigate the suit was privileged for reasons 
of national security.105 The government argued that, under Totten, the very subject 
matter of the lawsuit was a state secret and could not be litigated without 
reference to the privileged information.106 The government further asserted that, 
even if the very subject matter was not a state secret, the court should dismiss the 
 
96. Id. at 59–60. 
97. Id. at 60–61. These organizations are the U.N. Committee Against Torture, the U.N. 
Human Rights Committee, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on 
the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering 
Terrorism, and the U.N. Working Group on Arbitrary Detention. Id. 
98. Id. at 61–66. 
99. Id. at 62–63. 
100. Motion to Intervene, Jeppesen I, 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (No. 5:07-cv-
02798 (JW)); see also Complaint, Jeppesen I, 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (No. 5:07-cv-02798 (JW)). 
101. See Motion to Intervene at 3, Jeppesen I, 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (No. 5:07-cv-02798 (JW)). 
102. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). 
103. Jeppesen I, 539 F. Supp. 2d. at 1132. Although the Alien Tort Statute generally involves 
state action, the plaintiffs in Jeppesen alleged that Jeppesen Dataplan conspired with the government 
and aided and abetted the government in committing violations of the law of nations. See First 
Amended Complaint at 66–67, Jeppesen I, 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (No. 5:07-cv-02798 (JW)). 
104. See Notice of Motion and Motion to Intervene, Jeppesen I, 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (No. 
5:07-cv-02798 (JW)); see also Memorandum of Plaintiffs in Opposition to the United States’ Motion to 
Dismiss, or, in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment, Jeppesen I, 539 F. Supp. 2d at 1128 
(No. 5:07-cv-02798 (JW)). 
105. See Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss, or, in the Alternative, for Summary 
Judgment at 22–24, Jeppesen I, 539 F. Supp. 2d. 1128 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (No. 5:07-cv-02798 (JW)). 
106. Id. 12, 22–24. 
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case because the plaintiffs could not make out a prima facie case without the 
privileged information under Reynolds.107 
The plaintiffs, represented by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), 
responded that, even if the government’s claim of privilege was legitimate, it 
would be premature to dismiss the case before going through discovery of at least 
nonprivileged evidence.108 The plaintiffs further argued that the very subject 
matter of the case was not a state secret because use of extraordinary rendition 
had been publicly acknowledged by administration officials and the foreign 
governments that had investigated extraordinary rendition allegations.109 The 
district court, however, was more persuaded by the United States. The district 
court dismissed the action, finding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction under 
Totten because the very subject matter of the lawsuit was a state secret.110 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals unanimously reversed, 
finding that neither the Totten bar nor the Reynolds privilege were grounds for 
dismissal.111 The court emphatically disagreed with the district court, holding that 
the very subject matter theory of dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 
only applied in Totten cases premised on secret agreements and not merely where 
the Reynolds privilege was invoked.112 The panel stated that Totten was meant to 
apply only to cases in which the plaintiff had an espionage relationship with the 
government.113 Having reversed the dismissal, the panel remanded the case.114 
The Ninth Circuit then voted to hear the case en banc.115 On September 8, 
2010, in a 6 to 5 decision, a sharply divided and impassioned court reinstated the 
decision of the district court. The en banc court did not use the same theory as the 
district court. Instead of using the very subject matter theory, the court relied 
exclusively on the Reynolds privilege. It held that, even if privileged evidence were 
excluded from the proceedings, there was an “unacceptable risk” that privileged 
evidence would emerge during litigation (the “unacceptable risk theory”).116 
Although the court admitted that it was possible for the plaintiffs to make a prima 
facie case without privileged evidence, the court held that the risk of disclosure 
was too great to allow the case to proceed.117 
 
107. Id. at 11, 22–24. 
108. Memorandum of Plaintiffs in Opposition to the United States’ Motion to Dismiss or, in 
the Alternative, for Summary Judgment, Jeppesen I, 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (No. 5:07-cv-02798 (JW)). 
109. Id. at 32, 40–41. 
110. Jeppesen I, 539 F. Supp. 2d at 1136. 
111. Jeppesen II, 579 F.3d 943, 954 (9th Cir. 2009). 
112. Id. at 952–53. 
113. Id. at 954. 
114. Id. at 962. 
115. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 586 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2009). 
116. Jeppesen III, 614 F.3d 1070, 1083 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
117. Id. at 1087 (“Given plaintiff’s extensive submission of public documents and the stage of 
the litigation, we do not rely on the first two circumstances in which the Reynolds privilege requires 
dismissal . . . .”). 
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In its opinion, the en banc court relied heavily on El-Masri v. United States, a 
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals decision from 2007. The facts of that case are 
nearly identical to the Jeppesen case. In fact, Ben Wizner, attorney for the ACLU, 
was plaintiffs’ counsel in both Jeppesen and El-Masri.118 In that case, Khaled el-
Masri, a German citizen of Lebanese descent, was arrested in Macedonia and 
flown by Jeppesen, at the direction of the CIA, to Afghanistan.119 For the next six 
months, el-Masri was tortured and interrogated in much the same way as the 
Jeppesen plaintiffs.120 From very early on, CIA officials allegedly knew that el-Masri 
had been mistakenly arrested.121 Eventually Jeppesen employees transported and 
dumped el-Masri in Albania, and el-Masri later flew back to Germany.122 El-Masri 
sued under the Alien Tort Statute and under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of 
the Federal Bureau of Narcotics.123 
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld the district court’s 
dismissal after the United States invoked the Reynolds privilege.124 The court 
reasoned that state secrets were so central to the litigation of plaintiff’s claim that 
it required dismissal.125 The court also held that the case could not be litigated 
because nondisclosure of the privileged information could hypothetically deprive 
the defendants of a defense.126 
III. TRANSFORMATION OF THE DOCTRINE: EL-MASRI, JEPPESEN, AND 
REYNOLDS AS A DE FACTO IMMUNITY DOCTRINE 
The Reynolds privilege, as the dissent in Jeppesen pointed out, was intended to 
excuse defendants when they refused to produce documents during discovery, not 
to require complete dismissal of a case, as in Totten.127 Jeppesen and El-Masri misuse 
and confuse the privilege in three ways, each of which will be discussed in greater 
depth in the following Section. These points of confusion create a growing nexus 
between Reynolds and Totten, the latter of which should not have applied in either 
Jeppesen or El-Masri because those cases did not involve secret government 
agreements with the plaintiffs.128 First, the El-Masri court, like some other courts, 
 
118. El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 296 (4th Cir. 2007). 




123. Id.; Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 
(1971) (finding a cause of action where a federal officer can be held civilly liable for violation of an 
individual’s constitutional rights). See generally Michawl A. Rosenhouse, Annotation, Bivens Actions—
United States Supreme Court Cases, 22. A.L.R. Fed. 2d 179 (2007). 
124. El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 301. 
125. Id. at 302. 
126. Id. at 309. 
127. Jeppesen III, 614 F.3d 1070, 1098 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (Hawkins, J., dissenting). 
128. See supra note 55 and accompanying text for the proposition that Totten should only apply 
in cases where the plaintiff entered into a voluntary relationship with the government. 
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used the very subject matter theory, which was intended to be used exclusively in 
Totten cases, to dismiss cases under Reynolds. Second, Jeppesen took Reynolds into the 
realm of Totten through the rarely used unacceptable risk theory, which in 
application bears a striking resemblance to the very subject matter theory. Third, 
El-Masri, but notably not Jeppesen, further collapsed Reynolds and Totten by 
prohibiting litigation on the grounds that nondisclosure of privileged evidence 
could hypothetically deprive the defendants of a defense. Expanding the doctrine 
in this way creates several problems. The most obvious flaw with the conflation of 
these two doctrines, especially at the pleading stage, is that courts will more often 
be forced to dismiss legitimate claims, depriving plaintiffs of their day in court and 
precluding compensation for potentially outrageous harms. 
A. Misuse of the Very Subject Matter Theory 
The central problem with Jeppesen and El-Masri is that they confuse Reynolds 
and Totten in their use of the very subject matter theory. Other courts have done 
so as well.129 However, after Tenet v. Doe, it is clear that this is a mistake. The 
Supreme Court is partly at fault for this confusion. The language the Court used 
when discussing Totten and Reynolds is similar. For instance, the Court in Tenet, 
even while distinguishing between the two doctrines, referred to Totten as invoking 
the “privilege” rather than a bar or nonjusticiability doctrine.130 Nevertheless, 
Jeppesen and El-Masri, together and individually, have moved toward a de facto 
doctrine of immunity in place of the Reynolds privilege. In particular, El-Masri used 
this theory as the basis of its dismissal despite the fact that the court applied only 
Reynolds in its holding.131 
The district court in Jeppesen provides an excellent example of how courts, 
including the court in El-Masri, have failed to distinguish between Totten and 
Reynolds.132 In dismissing the case on nonjusticiability grounds because the very 
subject matter of the case was found to be a state secret, the court relied almost 
exclusively on the Ninth Circuit’s 1998 opinion in Kasza v. Browner.133 Kasza was a 
similar state secrets case that was dismissed at the pleading stage, purportedly 
under Reynolds, because the very subject matter of the case was a state secret.134 
 
129. See, e.g., Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159, 1166 (9th Cir. 1998) (referring to the “very 
subject matter” characterization as an aspect of the privilege while citing to Reynolds); see also Hepting 
v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974, 984 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (adopting Kasza’s problematic 
mischaracterization). 
130. Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 9 (2005) (“[W]here the very subject matter of the action, a 
contract to perform espionage, was a matter of state secret, we declared that such a case was to be 
dismissed on the pleadings without ever reaching the question of evidence, since it was so obvious that the action 
should never prevail over the privilege.”) (second emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(citing U.S. v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 11, n.26 (1953)). 
131. El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 304–05. 
132. Jeppesen I, 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (N.D. Cal. 2008). 
133. Id. at 1134–35 (quoting Kasza, 133 F.3d at 1166). 
134. Id. at 1170. 
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However, the Kasza court was mistaken in using this theory as a nonjusticiability 
doctrine. As discussed below, this theory was meant to apply only to Totten cases. 
In support of its decision to apply the very subject matter theory, Kasza cited only 
to footnote twenty-six in Reynolds.135 Footnote twenty-six in Reynolds cited Totten 
and read: 
See Totten v. United States, where the very subject matter of the action, a 
contract to perform espionage, was a matter of state secret. The action 
was dismissed on the pleadings without ever reaching the question of 
evidence, since it was so obvious that the action should never prevail 
over the privilege.136 
Thus, in Reynolds the Supreme Court merely cited Totten as support for the 
absolute nature of the privilege.137 Yet this footnote has since become the 
complete basis for using the very subject matter theory as a nonjusticiability 
doctrine within the Reynolds privilege. 
The three-judge panel in Jeppesen, which would have allowed the case to 
proceed, explained at great length this misinterpretation of the Reynolds footnote, 
which has unfortunately spawned an entire theory of dismissal: 
Neither does any Ninth Circuit or Supreme Court case law indicate that 
the “very subject matter” of any other kind of lawsuit is a state secret, 
apart from the limited factual context of Totten itself. The Supreme 
Court’s “very subject matter” language appeared in a footnote in Reynolds, 
where the Court simply characterized “the very subject matter of the 
[Totten lawsuit], a contract to perform espionage, [as] a matter of state 
secret.” That brief passage did not signal a deliberate expansion of 
Totten’s uncompromising dismissal rule beyond secret agreements with 
the government, and we decline to adopt that expansion here. Tenet leaves 
no doubt that the “sweeping holding in Totten” applies only to suits 
“where success depends on the existence of [the plaintiff’s] secret 
espionage relationship with the Government,” and that the state secrets 
privilege does not otherwise “provide the absolute protection” from suit 
available exclusively under “the Totten rule.”138 
The en banc panel in Jeppesen recognized the error other courts made in  
using the very subject matter theory, and the court criticized El-Masri ’s 
misinterpretation.139 The court explicitly stated the correct standard for the very 
subject matter theory in describing the law.140 However, where the Jeppesen en banc 
 
135. Id. at 1165. 
136. U.S. v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 11 n.26 (1953) (internal citations omitted). 
137. Id. at 11. 
138. Jeppesen II, 579 F.3d 943, 954–55 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal citations omitted); see also In re 
Sealed Case, 494 F.3d 139, 151 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (noting that the very subject matter theory was the 
result of a footnote in Reynolds that referenced Totten). 
139. Jeppesen III, 614 F.3d 1070, 1088 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
140. Id. at 1077–78. 
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panel succeeded in its recitation of the law, it failed in the application. In a 
footnote, the Jeppesen court explained the crux of its analysis: 
Notwithstanding its erroneous conflation of the Totten bar and the 
Reynolds privilege, we rely on El-Masri because it properly concluded—
with respect to allegations comparable to those here—that virtually any 
conceivable response to [plaintiffs’] allegations would disclose privileged 
information, and, therefore, that the action could not be litigated without 
threatening the disclosure of state secrets.141 
 This is the point where the court privileged facts rather than evidence. In 
referring to “privileged information,” the Jeppesen court referred to facts. There are 
multiple evidentiary avenues a party can use to prove a fact. By closing all of these 
avenues, where only one may be privileged, facts become privileged rather than 
evidence. In privileging information or facts, rather than simply evidence, the 
Jeppesen court applied the very subject matter theory; it simply altered the language. 
The Jeppesen court relied on El-Masri and used the same approach in reaching its 
conclusion. Even though the court acknowledged that El-Masri was mistaken in 
using the very subject matter theory, it borrowed El-Masri ’s reasoning in 
misapplying Reynolds. In fact, the Jeppesen court relied on other courts that had 
confused Totten and Reynolds in the same way El-Masri did.142 Jeppesen’s application 
is indistinguishable from the very subject matter theory on which other courts had 
erroneously relied. 
What is perhaps most frightening about this line of reasoning is that the use 
of the very subject matter theory in Reynolds would apply to any case involving 
torture or extraordinary rendition. In application, a de facto rule would altogether 
prohibit litigation of torture or rendition cases, even if plaintiffs could prove their 
cases with nonprivileged evidence. These are cases that go to the very heart of a 
free society, government accountability, human rights, and limitations on 
government authority. 
B. Unacceptable Risk of Disclosure Even with the Exclusion of Privileged Information 
The court in Jeppesen identified a rarely used theory under which Reynolds 
could be used to dismiss claims. This theory provides that a case should be 
dismissed if litigating the case “would present an unacceptable risk of disclosing 
state secrets,” even with the exclusion of privileged information.143 In asserting 
this unacceptable risk theory, the Jeppesen majority dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim in 
 
141. Id. at 1087 n.12 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
142. In addition to El-Masri, the Jeppesen court relied on Sterling v. Tenet, 416 F.3d 338, 347 
(9th Cir. 2005) (using the very subject matter theory), and Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159, 1166 
(9th Cir. 1998). 
143. Jeppesen III, 614 F.3d at 1083; see also El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 308 (4th Cir. 
2007) (“[A] proceeding in which the state secrets privilege is successfully interposed must be 
dismissed if the circumstances make clear that privileged information will be so central to the 
litigation that any attempt to proceed will threaten that information’s disclosure.”). 
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an unusual way.144 Very few cases had previously dismissed a claim using this 
theory. Even some of the few cases cited by Jeppesen as support for this theory 
were actually dismissed on other grounds.145 This is the least persuasive of 
Jeppesen’s justifications and is troubling for several reasons. 
The first reason why this is troubling is that there was no such risk in Jeppesen. 
The plaintiffs in Jeppesen claimed that they could make out a prima facie case 
without discovery, using only the nonprivileged evidence they had so far 
gathered.146 Presumably, therefore, they would not need to examine witnesses 
regarding anything close to the privileged evidence. In fact, if the plaintiffs could 
have made a prima facie case without discovery it is conceivable that the district 
court could have ordered summary judgment in their favor, assuming no facts 
were in dispute. In this case, attorneys would never even need to examine 
witnesses or introduce extra evidence that might include sensitive information. It 
seems bizarre, therefore, that this was the theory upon which the en banc panel 
dismissed the claim. This rationale is also problematic because courts following 
Jeppesen may use it to dismiss similar claims that do not rely on privileged evidence. 
The unacceptable risk theory is also troubling in a broader context. What 
exactly would create an “unacceptable risk” is unclear. Jeppesen and its supporting 
cases point only to the risk that a witness during examination may unintentionally 
or unknowingly reveal privileged information.147 This is questionable in at least 
two respects. First, is it really likely that during the course of litigation a witness or 
attorney would accidentally disclose privileged information? Second, does this 
actually protect secrecy? 
It is highly unlikely that adjudicating cases implicating state secrets would 
result in accidental disclosure of privileged material. The court’s witness 
examination example does not credibly support this notion.148 Lawsuits such as 
Jeppesen and El-Masri are highly sophisticated and are normally litigated by some of 
the nation’s finest attorneys. The court can reasonably expect these attorneys, 
typically litigating in teams, to lodge an objection when a question might implicate 
state secrets. Government attorneys in particular will likely be highly trained and 
informed with regard to all privileged information related to the case.149 
 
144. Jeppesen III, 614 F.3d at 1088 (holding that “any plausible effort by Jeppesen to defend 
against [plaintiffs’ claims] would create an unjustifiable risk of revealing state secrets, even if plaintiffs 
could make a prima facie case on one or more claims with nonprivileged evidence”). 
145. In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d 139, 153 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (dismissing the claim against one 
defendant because a prima facie case could not be made against him without privileged evidence); 
El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 308 (dismissing because the very subject matter of the case was a state secret). 
146. Oral Argument at 21:05, Jeppesen III, 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010) (No. 08-15693EB), 
available at http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/view_subpage.php?pk_id=0000004702. 
147. Jeppesen III, 614 F.3d at 1088; see also, e.g., Bareford v. General Dynamic Corp., 973 F.3d 
1138, 1144 (5th Cir. 1992); Farnsworth Cannon, Inc., v. Grimes, 635 F.2d 268, 281 (4th Cir. 1987); 
Fitzgerald v. Penthouse Intern., Inc., 776 F.2d 1236, 1243 (4th Cir. 1985). 
148. See Jeppesen III, 614 F.3d at 1088. 
149. The United States Attorney’s Office has its own very extensive training department. See 
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Similarly, it is also reasonable to expect attorneys to have the foresight to 
tailor their witness’s questions to appropriately limit potential disclosures. 
Although judges may sua sponte make objections to inadmissible evidence,150 in 
practice judges generally rely on attorneys to object if a question is privileged or 
otherwise inappropriate. Of course, the harm that could result when an attorney 
fails to object to a leading question is minor compared to the harm that may result 
if an attorney fails to object to a question that induces a witness to disclose 
privileged information. Nevertheless, when dealing with testimony regarding such 
extraordinarily sensitive issues, it is incumbent upon the attorneys, witnesses, and 
the court to adjust their awareness and caution accordingly. When conducting and 
objecting to examinations of witnesses about extraordinary rendition, it is highly 
likely that witnesses, attorneys, and the court will ensure that every word of 
testimony is deliberate. It is conceivable, admittedly, that in all of the state secrets 
cases the occasional witness might fail to censor his or her own speech and 
mistakenly reveal privileged information, but this remote possibility is insufficient 
to support the Jeppesen court’s unacceptable risk theory. 
In addition, the court’s hypothetical underestimates witnesses’ ability to 
regulate the scope of their testimony and the scope of witness preparation. 
Counsel for the government could instruct witnesses before examination on how 
to avoid using privileged information. Cases implicating state secrets involve 
government activity at the highest levels of the executive branch. In fact, invoking 
the privilege requires the personal approval of the U.S. Attorney General.151 It is 
unlikely that attorneys, under these circumstances, will fail to properly control 
witnesses and allow sensitive material to leak out. This unlikely scenario does not 
justify the vastly more draconian result of dismissing these cases outright. 
Nevertheless, there is admittedly some risk of inadvertent or accidental 
disclosure. Although attorneys and witnesses may be held to a high standard in 
cases such as Jeppesen and El-Masri, the prospect of an errant fax, misaddressed  
e-mail, or rambling witness is not entirely imaginary. Moreover, it is conceivable 
that secret information could be inferred through publicly available information. 
For instance, a witness who was tortured may be examined concerning the injuries 
he or she suffered. A thorough examination such as this may lead to inferred 
 
Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys, Office of Legal Educ., CLE for Agency Counsel, JUSTICE.GOV, 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/ole/cle/index.html (last modified Sept. 27, 2010). 
150. See 3 FRED LANE, GOLDSTEIN TRIAL TECHNIQUE § 13:37 (3d ed. 1984) (The judge 
“may sustain objections on her own, even when not made by counsel. This is in line with her duty to 
prevent a miscarriage of justice. Consistent with this duty, a trial judge may sua sponte object to 
improper conduct or irrelevant evidence, and may also delete objectionable material from certain 
documents originally admitted into evidence although there has been no objection.”). 
151. See Eric Holder, Memorandum from the Attorney Gen. to the Heads of Executive 
Dep’ts and Agencies on Policies and Procedures Governing Invocation of the State Secrets Privilege 
(Sept. 23, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/state-secret-privileges.pdf. 
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disclosure of secret interrogation techniques or other sensitive information. Thus, 
there are two legitimate fears: that of the errant fax and that of inferred disclosure. 
These fears are either mitigated or outweighed by other important interests. 
First, attorneys and litigants in cases where state secrets are at issue are generally 
extremely competent and will inevitably hold themselves to high professional 
standards. No attorney would carelessly risk the tremendous reputational injury 
and possible disciplinary action that could result from accidentally disclosing state 
secrets. Second, these risks must be balanced against the need for the fair 
administration of justice and government accountability. The Reynolds doctrine 
does, after all, represent a balancing approach to the state secrets problem. When 
balanced against such important values, the low risk of inadvertent disclosure is 
tolerable. Lastly, every state secrets case will involve a certain element of risk. 
Dismissal on this basis is troubling because any case that implicates state secrets 
arguably poses this same risk. As such, any state secrets case could be dismissed 
on this basis. 
Another problem with the unacceptable risk theory is that, unlike the very 
subject matter theory, the unacceptable risk theory is not fact-specific.152 The 
benefit of a fact-specific analysis is that it is much more limited in scope. Thus, it 
is considerably less likely to operate as an immunity or nonjusticiability doctrine. 
However, that is not the case under the unacceptable risk theory. Because it is 
unbounded by the facts of the case, the government could potentially use the 
unacceptable risk theory to argue for dismissal of substantially more cases, even 
where there is little evidence that state secrets will be revealed. The court’s only 
justification for this principle suggests that witnesses may accidentally or 
unknowingly disclose privileged information on direct or cross-examination.153 
There will undoubtedly be direct and cross-examination of witnesses who possess 
privileged information in almost every lawsuit that implicates state secrets. The 
pervasiveness of this risk highlights the need for a foundational shift in handling 
state secrets cases, a need that could be best satisfied with the creation of a subject 
matter court.154 
C. Dismissal Based on Deprivation of a Hypothetical Defense 
One area in which El-Masri and Jeppesen diverge is the effect of a defense that 
potentially lies within the privileged material. El-Masri takes the more expansive 
view; in El-Masri the hypothetical loss of a defense through the exclusion of 
privileged evidence is a basis for dismissal (the “hypothetical defense theory”).155 
 
152. It is unclear whether the hypothetical defense theory, as mentioned by El-Masri, would 
be fact-specific because the court does not explain how that theory would work in practice. El-Masri 
v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 310 (4th Cir. 2007). 
153. In re United States, 872 F.2d 472, 481 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
154. See infra Part V.B.3. 
155. El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 310 (“We do not, of course, mean to suggest that any of these 
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The Jeppesen court, on the other hand, ruled out dismissal based on a hypothetical 
defense, but allowed dismissal based on an actual defense: “If the [Reynolds] 
privilege deprives the defendant of information that would otherwise give the 
defendant a valid defense to the claim, then the court may grant summary 
judgment to the defendant.”156 These grounds differ substantially from the very 
subject matter and unacceptable risk theories cited by Jeppesen. In this case, the 
dismissal would be, in effect, a grant of summary judgment. 
The hypothetical defense theory is a dangerous expansion of the state secrets 
doctrine. The El-Masri court asserted that even hypothetical defenses that might 
not represent “the true state of affairs” could support dismissal.157 This standard is 
purely speculative and would occur during a nascent stage of litigation. The El-
Masri court did not explain how this theory would work in practice. The 
hypothetical defense theory has since been rejected by every other circuit to 
address this issue.158 There are good reasons why it has been so soundly rejected. 
There is no reason why a defendant should not have to assert an authentic, if 
general, defense rather than a conceivable defense. This could be done in a way 
that does not reveal any factual information, such as through an ex parte filing or 
under a gag order. 
The hypothetical defense theory could apply to any case as it is based on 
speculation. This is a true expansion of Reynolds into a nonjusticiability doctrine. It 
is unlikely that a plaintiff would be capable of successfully litigating a claim with 
this standard in place. However, El-Masri appears to be an outlier in this respect, 
as even Jeppesen did not use this approach. 
IV. THE PROBLEMS WITH OVERINCLUSIVE DISMISSAL: DISMISSAL OF 
LEGITIMATE CLAIMS AND THE FAILURE TO PROTECT SECRECY 
An expansion of Reynolds into the realm of Totten might be appropriate if this 
expansion served the interests of national security. In the absence of this 
justification, the only effect is to deprive plaintiffs of legitimate claims while 
undermining the principles the legal system serves to protect—the very same 
principles the court in Jeppesen admittedly struggled to balance.159 Jeppesen and 
El-Masri do not serve the interests of national security for two reasons. First, the 
facts that the government sought to conceal were already known to the general 
 
hypothetical defenses represents the true state of affairs . . . .”). 
156. Jeppesen III, 614 F.3d 1070, 1083 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (quoting Kasza v. Browner, 133 
F.3d 1159, 1166 (9th Cir. 1998)); see also In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d 139 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Tenenbaum 
v. Simonini, 372 F.3d 776, 777 (6th Cir. 2004); Bareford v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 973 F.2d 1138 (5th 
Cir. 1992). 
157. El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 310. 
158. See Tenenbaum, 372 F.3d at 777–78; Bareford, 973 F.2d at 1141; Zuckerbraun v. Gen. 
Dynamics Corp., 935 F.2d 544, 547 (2d Cir. 1991). 
159. Jeppesen III, 614 F.3d 1070, 1073 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
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public. Second, intense secrecy breeds distrust of the U.S. government among 
foreign governments and peoples. 
On the surface, the most apparent danger of the Jeppesen and El-Masri 
approach is that plaintiffs with legitimate claims may be denied their day in court 
and prevented from obtaining compensation for their injuries. However, the 
danger goes much deeper than that. Rendition, torture, and forced disappearance 
are not ordinary allegations or theories of recovery. The claims in Jeppesen and El-
Masri come at a crossroads between liberty and authoritarian government. With 
the blurring of the lines of the privilege comes the traditional slippery slope danger 
of continuous expansion of government authority. The danger is further 
exacerbated by the values the privilege tends to compromise—the values of 
transparency, accountability, human rights, and limits on government authority. 
A slightly more subtle danger is the possibility that the government will 
invoke the privilege to effectively insulate government actions from judicial review 
even when state secrets are not actually at stake. In some cases, Reynolds might 
even preclude judges from reviewing the government evidence supporting the 
claim of privilege “alone, in chambers.”160 If even judges cannot review claims of 
privilege, it would be one of the few areas where there would be no check on the 
executive branch. More worrisome, the privilege resides in areas where 
government skepticism should be at its peak: military and national security affairs. 
Taken to an extreme, the executive branch could target rival political figures for 
detainment, extraordinary rendition, interrogation, or other illegal acts, and then 
insulate its actions from future judicial review by arguing that the sensitive nature 
of the evidence necessitates dismissal. Thus, in cases where significant evidence of 
government wrongdoing is not public, the executive’s power to have lawsuits 
dismissed, forever hiding their contents from the public, is a supremely powerful 
tool. The privilege is so powerful that, if used without supervision, it could have 
dire consequences. 
In many cases, there will be little or no national security interest in 
concealing the evidence because it will already be public. For example, the tragic 
irony of Jeppesen and El-Masri is that the dismissal of those claims likely did very 
little to protect secrecy. For instance, the defendants in Jeppesen argued that the 
claim must be dismissed at the pleading stage because allowing Jeppesen to file a 
responsive pleading would require Jeppesen to either admit or deny a relationship 
with the government—a state secret.161 But this relationship was already publicly 
known to exist. The CEO of Jeppesen was on the record before the media 
admitting that Jeppesen Dataplan conducted the government’s torture flights.162 
Concealing this fact during litigation, therefore, accomplished nothing to protect 
 
160. U.S. v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953). 
161. Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss, or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment 
by the United States, Jeppesen I, 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (No. 5:07-cv-02798 (JW)). 
162. Jeppesen III, 614 F.3d at 1106 (appendix) (Hawkins, J. dissenting). 
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its secrecy. In fact, the publicly available information on the rendition flights was 
so extensive that the dissent in Jeppesen elected to attach an appendix summarizing 
over 1,800 pages of information submitted by the plaintiffs.163 It is ironic that the 
Jeppesen majority claimed to be protecting privileged information when the very 
publication of its opinion led to the widespread dissemination of privileged 
information. The existence of this voluminous and publicly available information 
makes it crystal clear that very little of that non-public information would have 
been litigated because this voluminous evidence was likely sufficient to prove the 
plaintiffs’ case. Considering almost everything was already publicly known, the 
security interest in preventing the lawsuit from progressing was minimal. 
Even if the litigation did result in disclosure of information, it is possible that 
this information would have been publicly disclosed anyway by the plaintiffs via 
the media. It is difficult to imagine that the Jeppesen litigation would have revealed 
anything that the plaintiffs at least did not already know. The five plaintiffs were, 
after all, incarcerated for years and interacted with a myriad of U.S. officials. 
Further, everything they learned could be freely reported to the media, as was the 
case with Khaled el-Masri.164 Because of this, whether the secret information came 
out through a plaintiff’s interview with the media or through a judicial opinion, 
the effect would have been the same: to place security at risk. It is hypothetically 
possible that, had Jeppesen proceeded, a dangerous state secret that none of the 
plaintiffs knew about would have come out, resulting in disaster for the United 
States, but this is unlikely. Moreover, this concern is better addressed through 
reform of the state secrets doctrine rather than through any of the Jeppesen 
theories. In particular, this hypothetical would never arise were the case litigated in 
a subject matter court designed to handle such matters. 
V. SOLUTIONS AND ALTERNATIVES 
Having painted a dark picture using the opinions of Jeppesen and El-Masri, it is 
useful to look at ways of brightening the canvas. There are several methods 
through which this can be accomplished. First, given that the state secrets doctrine 
has developed through the common law, there certainly must be an alternative 
judicial approach to reform the doctrine. Of course, this may not solve the entire 
problem. Larger, more structural changes to the doctrine are also appealing. In the 
alternative, Congress has the authority to shape the doctrine from the top down in 
the form of legislation. Each of these solutions, while improving upon Jeppesen and 
El-Masri, leave open certain holes. There is, however, at least one solution that 
largely protects state secrets and the rights of litigants: the creation of a subject 
matter court. 
 
163. Id. at 1095 n.2. 
164. For one of the news reports resulting from el-Masri’s interviews with the media, see 
James Meek, They Beat Me from All Sides, GUARDIAN (Jan. 26, 2012, 1:00 PM), http://www 
.guardian.co.uk/world/2005/jan/14/usa.germany. 
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A. An Alternative Judicial Approach: A Return to Reynolds 
Despite the growing popularity of the Jeppesen/El-Masri approach,165 not all 
courts have allowed dismissal when plaintiffs were able to make out a prima facie 
case with nonprivileged evidence. One alternative to Jeppesen/El-Masri is the D.C. 
Circuit’s approach in Ellsburg v. Mitchell166 and, more significantly, in In re United 
States.167 Ellsburg is a traditional, status quo application of Reynolds. The case 
emerged tangentially from the “Pentagon Papers” criminal prosecution in the 
1970’s.168 The defendants and their attorneys from the prior criminal case alleged 
that federal government officials had subjected them to warrantless wiretapping, 
and sued several government agencies for damages.169 Although the government 
initially admitted to conducting several of the wiretaps, it later refused to respond 
to the plaintiffs’ other allegations on the ground that the evidence was protected 
by the state secrets privilege.170 The court described the application of Reynolds 
differently from either El-Masri or Jeppesen: 
The effect of the government’s successful invocation of the state secrets 
privilege, when the government is not itself a party to the suit in question, 
is well established: “[T]he result is simply that the evidence is unavailable, 
as though a witness had died, and the case will proceed accordingly, with 
no consequences save those resulting from the loss of the evidence.” 
Likewise, it is now settled that, when the government is a defendant in a 
civil suit, its invocation of the privilege results in no alteration of 
pertinent substantive or procedural rules; the effect is the same, in other 
words, as if the government were not involved in the controversy.171 
Ellsburg simply made the privileged material unavailable, an approach that was 
affirmed in In re Sealed Case, which was decided the same year as El-Masri.172 
The other D.C. Circuit case mentioned above, however, best exemplifies this 
approach to the exclusion of evidence. In In re United States, the difference between 
the Jeppesen/El-Masri approach and the D.C. Circuit’s approach is striking. In that 
case, the plaintiff, through Freedom of Information Act requests, claimed that she 
could make a prima facie case without discovery and without using privileged 
documents.173 The court allowed the case to move forward, stating: “Denying 
discovery, but letting the action go forward, is simply a less drastic solution than 
 
165. See, e.g., Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 52–54 (D.D.C. Dec. 7, 2010) (citing 
exclusively to Jeppesen and Reynolds in its discussion of state secrets) (dismissed on other grounds). 
166. Ellsburg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
167. In re United States, 872 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
168. Ellsburg, 709 F.2d at 52; In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d 139 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
169. Ellsburg, 709 F.2d at 53. 
170. Id. at 53–54. 
171. Id. at 64 (quoting MCCORMICK’S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 233 (E. 
Cleary ed., 1972) (footnote omitted)). 
172. In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d at 139. 
173. In re United States, 872 F.2d at 481. 
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the outright dismissal authorized by our previous cases.”174 This stands in stark 
contrast to the Jeppesen approach where the court dismissed the action despite the 
plaintiffs’ claim that they could make out a case without privileged information. 
The In re United States court also followed the Reynolds Court’s original intention of 
allowing multiple avenues to discovery.175 In other words, the D.C. Circuit 
acknowledged what the Jeppesen and El-Masri courts failed to embrace: that when 
there are both privileged and non-privileged avenues to the same information, 
either of which could make a prima facie case, dismissal is unnecessary.176 
The D.C. Circuit’s approach in Ellsburg and In re United States does a better 
job than Jeppesen and El-Masri of balancing government interests with the needs of 
the plaintiffs. The simple concept of excluding evidence rather than dismissing 
cases allows plaintiffs to attempt to make a prima facie case in spite of the 
privilege.177 Nevertheless, even this approach has substantial problems. First, this 
approach still allows courts to dismiss claims where a judge, in camera, verifies the 
validity of an actual defense within privileged evidence.178 Ergo, a plaintiff cannot 
critique that defense, attack it, contradict it, or otherwise contest its validity. 
Nevertheless, as the court in In re Sealed Case pointed out, this is still preferable to 
the hypothetical defense theory used in El-Masri, where even a hypothetical 
defense could result in dismissal.179 Lastly, the D.C. Circuit’s approach remains 
flawed in that it allows courts to dismiss cases based on privileged information 
that is in the hands of the plaintiff and is therefore no longer secret.180 
Despite its flaws, the D.C. Circuit’s approach preserves the plaintiff’s access 
to multiple evidentiary methods of proving the same facts. Jeppesen and El-Masri, in 
dismissing cases even when a prima facie case could be made, represent a much 
greater nexus between Reynolds and Totten. The D.C. Circuit’s approach, even with 
its flaws, is preferable because it does not collapse the two rules. The D.C. 
 
174. Id. 
175. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 11, (1953) (stating that the respondents could have 
reached the necessary information through examination of witnesses, to which the government 
agreed). 
176. In re United States, 872 F.2d at 481 (“At the same time, an action as to which a certain 
avenue of discovery would compromise state secrets need not be dismissed if an alternative, non-
sensitive avenue of discovery is available. In Reynolds, the Supreme Court held that the Government 
could prevent discovery of a sensitive report sought by plaintiffs in their wrongful death case arising 
out of the crash of a military aircraft. The Court noted, however, that a readily available alternative to 
disclosure of the sensitive information existed . . . to adduce the essential facts without resort to 
material touching upon military secrets.”) (internal citations omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
177. In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d at 149–50. 
178. In re United States, 872 F.2d at 481–82. 
179. In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d at 149–50 (stating that the hypothetical defense model would 
mean “virtually every case in which the United States successfully invokes the state secrets privileged 
would need to be dismissed . . . [resulting in] a system of conjecture”). 
180. Ellsburg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 65 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
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Circuit’s approach may thus allow more claims to go forward in the D.C. Circuit, 
as opposed to the Ninth and Fourth Circuits. 
B. Opportunities for Structural Reform 
1. Congressional Alternatives: Legislative Reform 
One intriguing proposal is Congress’ State Secrets Protection Act (SSPA).181 
The SSPA, in essence, is aimed at administering a new set of procedures for judges 
to handle state secrets cases. The proposed law would allow claims to proceed 
while still preserving the secrecy of privileged information. 
The SSPA begins by defining the term “state secret.” Seemingly obvious, this 
is important, as no court has given a more precise definition of the term than that 
offered by Reynolds decades ago.182 Reynolds described state secrets as “matters 
which, in the interest of national security, should not be divulged.”183 In contrast, 
the SSPA defines a “state secret” as “any information that, if disclosed publicly, 
would be reasonably likely to cause significant harm to the national defense or 
foreign relations of the United States.”184 There are several notable differences 
between these definitions, such as the SSPA’s limitation to the United States and 
the “reasonably likely” qualifier. However, of more subtle importance is the 
requirement that the information be “disclosed publicly” rather than “divulged.” 
“Disclosed publicly” leaves open the possibility that plaintiffs could use sensitive 
evidence if it was disclosed under seal or in camera. 
The SSPA provides a plethora of mechanisms to preserve the secrecy of 
information during litigation of state secrets claims. For instance, the SSPA 
requires that courts use the security procedures established in the Classified 
Information Procedures Act.185 However, the most appealing aspect of the SSPA 
is that it prohibits dismissal on state secrets grounds outside of limited 
circumstances.186 The SSPA would allow for dismissal only if litigation in the 
absence of the privileged material, or substitute material, would “substantially 
impair the ability of a party to pursue a valid defense to the claim or 
counterclaim.”187 
The inclusion of nonprivileged substitute material is another significant 
 
181. State Secrets Protection Act, S. 417, 111th Cong. (2009). A similar bill was proposed in 
the House of Representatives. See H.R. 984, 111th Cong. (2009). 
182. See, e.g., Jeppesen III, 614 F.3d 1070, 1082 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (“We do not offer a 
detailed definition of what constitutes a state secret. The Supreme Court in Reynolds found it sufficient 
to say that the privilege covers ‘matters which, in the interest of national security, should not be 
divulged.’”) (citing U.S. v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953)). 
183. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10. 
184. S. 417 § 4501. 
185. Id. § 4507(a). 
186. Id. § 4503(b). 
187. Id. §§ 4505(1), (3). 
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feature of the SSPA. It requires that the government provide a nonprivileged 
substitute when material evidence is excluded as privileged.188 If a nonprivileged 
substitute is not provided, then the court can resolve the factual dispute in favor 
of the civilian party.189 This mechanism amply protects plaintiffs in state secrets 
cases. Requiring nonprivileged substitutes ensures that as much evidence as 
possible is made available to plaintiffs. Further, it would discourage the 
government from asserting the privilege frivolously. 
Unfortunately, both the Senate and the House bills have not been active 
since 2009.190 Additionally, several of the Senate sponsors are no longer sitting.191 
Considering this, it is difficult to imagine that a bill similar to the SSPA will 
become law unless a dramatic national event occurs to alter the lack of 
momentum. 
2. Congressional Alternatives: Oversight 
Another option for effectively limiting application of the privilege is 
establishing a Congressional oversight committee to review the executive branch’s 
invocation of the privilege. There are advantages to this alternative. Members of 
Congress certainly can be trusted with knowledge related to state secrets, although 
one could still argue they lack the same expertise as the executive. Moreover, 
congressional authority to conduct such investigations is well established.192 A 
simple method of implementing congressional oversight would be to add an 
additional step in the Reynolds procedure for invoking the privilege. For instance, in 
addition to having the Attorney General personally review the claim of privilege, a 
congressional oversight committee could be required, perhaps even as part of the 
Reynolds test, to approve the use of the privilege. 
For historical precedent, one can look to the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence (SSCI) and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
(HPSCI), which have monitored the CIA for decades.193 The Independent 
Counsel Statute is a good practical model.194 This statute allows the Attorney 
General to appoint independent counsel to conduct investigations of high-ranking 
individuals such as the president, vice president, department heads, and the 
 
188. Id. § 4504(f), (g). 
189. Id. 
190. State Secrets Protection Act, S. 417 111th Cong. (2009), available at http://www.gov 
track.us/congress/bills/111/s417; State Secrets Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 984 111th Cong. (2009), 
available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/hr984. 
191. For example, one of the sponsors, the late Senator Edward (“Ted”) Kennedy, died in 
August of 2009. Ted Kennedy Dies of Brain Cancer at the Age of 77, ABC NEWS (Aug. 26, 2009), 
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/TedKennedy/story?id=6692022#.TyonT1zy8z0. 
192. See generally 91 C.J.S. United States § 34 (2011). 
193. James S. Van Wagenen, A Review of Congressional Oversight: Critics and Defenders, CIA.GOV 
(Jan. 23, 2012, 10:00 AM), https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi- 
publications/csi-studies/studies/97unclass/wagenen.html; see also 10 U.S.C. § 1614 (2006). 
194. 28 U.S.C. §§ 591–99 (2006). 
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director of the CIA.195 The Independent Counsel Statute grants Congress 
jurisdiction over the independent counsel’s conduct, in addition to requiring 
reporting.196 Similarly, the Attorney General could be required to appoint 
independent counsel to evaluate and defend state secrets actions. The independent 
counsel would then be required to report to Congress, perhaps before a formal 
invocation of the doctrine at the district court level. This would give Congress the 
chance to push back, if necessary, on the executive branch’s use of the privilege. 
In the alternative, Congress could simply pass a statute that requires the Attorney 
General to obtain the approval of a congressional oversight committee, such as 
the SSCI or HPSCI, before approving the invocation of the privilege (as required 
by Reynolds). 
Nevertheless, there are problems with such a mechanism. The risk of 
politicizing national security measures may be undesirable. Second, it is debatable, 
some would say doubtful, whether members of Congress have any more national 
security expertise than the judiciary. On the other hand, Congress often deals with 
immense issues of national security, such as implementing the Patriot Act or 
funding specific Department of Defense projects. Congressional oversight can 
take so many forms that it is difficult to imagine that some of these concerns 
cannot be obviated. Lastly, there are a multitude of congressional oversight 
committees that have debatable effectiveness. It would surprise very few if such a 
committee either acted as a rubber stamp or otherwise approached the function 
with apathy. Despite these flaws, congressional involvement in the privilege would 
certainly be a step in the right direction. 
3. A Judicial Alternative: In Camera Trials and a Subject Matter Court 
If secrecy is the problem with litigating privileged information, then there 
must be methods to litigate cases while preserving secrecy. There must be a 
middle ground between public disclosure and complete dismissal. In camera trials 
or, ideally, a subject matter court are the most complete solutions to problematic 
state secrets cases because they would nearly eliminate the secrecy problem from 
the proceedings. 
In camera trials could meet this need. This idea has been suggested by courts 
before; in one instance a court even suggested that all counsel and even the 
stenographer receive security clearances before proceeding to an in camera trial.197 
Cases could proceed as bench trials under permanent seal. This would eliminate 
almost any risk of exposure of state secrets. Aspects of this approach have also 
been suggested by courts as possible solutions.198 Nevertheless, there are at least 
 
195. Id. 
196. Id. § 595. 
197. Farnsworth Cannon v. Grimes, 635 F.2d 268 (4th Cir. 1980). 
198. Doe v. Tenet, 329 F.3d 1135, 1152 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Finally, sealing of records and secret 
hearings are possible ways to adjudicate issues without public exposure of state secrets.”), rev’d, 544 
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three significant problems with this approach. First, cases implicating state secrets 
may require a certain level of expertise that most judges do not have. Second, the 
judge would have to make all factual and legal determinations alone. However, in 
one variation of this model, it would be conceivable to utilize attorneys bound by 
court order not to divulge state secrets outside of the litigation; the threat of 
disbarment, contempt, or other sanctions should be sufficient to prevent secrets 
from leaking out. Lastly, the benefits of an open judicial system would be lost. 
Overall, the creation of a subject matter court is the most attractive 
alternative.199 A model for such a court already exists in the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court (FISC).200 This court has a very similar purview as a potential 
state secrets court in that it monitors secret intelligence-gathering activities that 
implicate national security. FISC decides whether or not to grant highly secretive 
intelligence-gathering warrants to the government concerning electronic 
eavesdropping—often in matters dealing with national security.201 In fact, FISC’s 
jurisdiction could simply be expanded to include cases implicating state secrets. As 
experienced federal judges dealing mostly with so-called paper trials while serving 
on FISC, it would be a smooth transition for this court to adopt a new docket. 
This solution is more convenient because it simply expands the docket of an 
already existing and amply qualified court. Additionally, there has already been 
some overlap between FISC issues and state secrets cases. For instance, in Al-
Haramain Islamic Foundation v. Bush, one of the parties argued that the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) statute preempted the state secrets 
privilege.202 The Ninth Circuit did not decide that issue because it was not raised 
in the district court, but the court did compare the statutory approach of FISA 
with the common law approach of the state secrets privilege.203 Although there are 
many benefits to expanding FISC’s jurisdiction, critics might see it as a 
concentration of power in an already mysterious entity. Further, the creation of an 
entirely new subject matter court would allow Congress to design a court specific 
to the needs of state secrets cases. 
Whether FISC’s jurisdiction is simply expanded or a new court is created 
from scratch, there are numerous advantages to a subject matter court. A subject 
 
U.S. 1 (2005); see also, e.g., In re United States, 872 F.2d 472, 478 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Halpern v. United 
States, 258 F.2d 36, 43 (2d Cir. 1958). 
199. Professor Robert M. Chesney, of Wake Forest University School of Law, advocates for 
this solution as well. See Robert M. Chesney, State Secrets and the Limits of National Security Litigation, 75 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1249, 1313 (2007). 
200. The FISC court is a product of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), 50 
U.S.C. § 1803 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010). 
201. See Eric Lightblau, Judges on Secretive Panel Speak Out on Spy Program, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 
2006, at A19, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/29/politics/29nsa.html. 
202. Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190, 1205 (9th Cir. 2007). 
203. Id. at 1206. It should be noted that one district court did find that FISA preempted the 
state secrets privilege in electronic surveillance, partly abrogating the privilege. In re Nat’l Sec. Agency 
Telecomms. Records Litig., 564 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2008). 
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matter court has the potential, depending on the individual judges appointed, to 
render moot the oft-cited argument that Article III judges do not have the 
expertise to make judicial determinations regarding state secrets and should thus 
defer to the executive branch.204 FISA presents a straightforward model for the 
selection of FISC judges: the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court selects district 
court judges to fill seats on FISC.205 In creating a subject matter court, the same 
approach could be used. In the alternative, each federal circuit could select one of 
its members to sit by designation on the subject matter court. These selection 
procedures would arguably ensure that the judges were insulated from the political 
process and qualified to handle state secrets cases with appropriate expertise. 
The most significant problem with the creation of a subject matter court 
relates to plaintiff participation. Congress may have to limit plaintiff participation, 
to a certain extent, to prevent plaintiffs from learning sensitive information. For 
instance, if the court needed to examine documents detailing the coordinates of 
secret military installations, the plaintiff likely could not participate in a hearing on 
the matter or be served briefs, motions, or other documents with such details. The 
extent of this limitation would depend upon the individual circumstances of the 
case. If the entirety of the claims at issue were privileged, then it is possible that 
the majority of the proceedings would occur in camera or under seal. However, 
this could be remedied to a certain extent by using guardians ad litem. The court 
could appoint individuals with appropriate security clearances to argue on behalf 
of the plaintiffs in such circumstances. Or, if the sensitive information at issue is 
minimal, the court could simply impose a gag order, with potential sanctions or 
contempt if violated, on the parties and then allow full plaintiff participation. The 
circumstances of each case may dictate the nature of the proceedings. These 
varying circumstances underscore the need for a specialized court that can adapt 
to individual cases. 
Despite the myriad of benefits a subject matter court offers, there are, of 
course, some downsides. One of the central functions of the judiciary is 
transparency. In camera hearings, private proceedings, and the permanent seal of 
documents prevent the public exposure of governmental activity. Although 
preserving this secrecy allows claims to proceed, it comes at the cost of public 
knowledge. On the other hand, the public still benefits from the proceedings 
because allowing the claims to proceed can deter the government from violating 
the law in the same way tort law encourages the public to adhere to a standard of 
care. Nevertheless, the deterrent effect of public exposure is somewhat lost with 
such a solution. Alternately, Congress could mitigate this quandary by requiring 
the subject matter court to have closed hearings where attorneys for both sides 
 
204. See, e.g., Oral Argument at 13:55, Jeppesen III, 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010) (No. 08-
15693EB), available at http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/view_subpage.php?pk_id=0000004702. 
205. See 50 U.S.C. § 1803. 
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participate under court-ordered confidentiality. A gag order on attorneys sworn to 
uphold the law may be sufficient to ensure the secrecy of sensitive material. 
However, this variation would require placing a great deal of trust in attorneys. 
Despite its flaws, in camera trials or a subject matter court would go a long way to 
allowing plaintiffs to litigate legitimate claims. In its application, a subject matter 
court, FISC or otherwise, would satisfy the two most important considerations: 
protecting secret information and allowing plaintiffs with legitimate claims to have 
their day in court. 
Overall, the subject matter court is more advantageous than congressional 
proposals like the State Secrets Protection Act. First, a subject matter court could 
be composed of judges with expertise in national security or foreign relations. 
Second, a subject matter court would offer the advantage, and the obvious 
disadvantages, of a single location. A court in a single location would be better 
equipped to ensure security, while some district courts may be unsecure for the 
purpose of conducting in camera hearings of highly sensitive material. 
Nevertheless, maintaining litigation in the district court of original filing would 
have other advantages. District courts may be more convenient for plaintiffs, the 
expense of creating a new subject matter court would be avoided, and a greater 
diversity of judges would allow for a diversity of interpretation. In sum, a subject 
matter court would not only allow for the greatest flexibility in reshaping the 
doctrine, but would do so in the most effective, substantive manner. 
CONCLUSION 
There must be a balance between guarding state secrets and the values of 
liberty and transparency. However, at some point this balance tips too far in one 
direction. Jeppesen and El-Masri have reached that point. In Jeppesen the en banc 
court recognized that there are cases where the interest of justice must be 
sacrificed in the interest of national security.206 At times, this may be true. The 
caveat is that expanding this sacrifice beyond instances in which it is absolutely 
necessary presents great danger. Justice, transparency, and accountability are 
simply too important to be so easily dismissed. 
In addition to these larger goals of the justice system, the plaintiffs from 
Jeppesen and El-Masri must not be forgotten. As illustrated in Section II, these 
individuals underwent incredible hardship; they deserve some sort of 
compensation. What makes their cases unique is that the cases were dismissed 
regardless of whether they could make out a prima facie case with nonprivileged 
evidence. When a legal system filters out perfectly legitimate claims that can be 
proven without privileged information, there is, undoubtedly, something 
fundamentally flawed. 
The solutions discussed above are designed to correct this failure. A remedy 
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is available through the common law in an alternative judicial approach. However, 
this would likely require the Supreme Court to issue a definitive and 
comprehensive opinion on the subject, which the Court has been reluctant to 
do.207 Structural remedies such as a subject matter court or increased procedural 
safeguards could significantly alter the balance and are the best overall options at 
this time. Of course, congressional action is necessary for such an undertaking. 
These solutions are nevertheless more desirable than the continued confusion of 
the Totten and Reynolds rules and the resulting dismissal of legitimate claims. 
Other questions outside of these solutions still remain. Should the privilege 
exist in cases where the executive branch has exceeded its constitutional authority? 
Or in cases where violations of jus cogens have taken place? Should the privilege 
exist at all? Is it time for a statutory framework to take the place of the judicially 
fashioned framework? Each of these reflects legitimate concerns. While those 
questions remain unanswered, it is frightfully clear that the balance struck by 
Jeppesen and El-Masri tilts too heavily in one direction. 
 
 
207. See, e.g., Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2442 (2011) (mem.) (denying the 
Jeppesen plaintiffs’ petition for certiorari). 
